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ABSTRACT 
 
Since the financial crisis of 1997, the South Korean government has moved towards a 
new market-driven paradigm of economic growth based on foreign direct investment 
(FDI) replacing the decades old state-driven economic growth model.  One of the 
attempts made by the government is its ambition to transform the nation into a business 
and economic hub of Northeast Asia.  However, despite the growing concern on the topic 
among government agencies, media, research centers and academia, the absence of a 
cohesive and realistic approach to the issue is a relative void in the literature.  This 
paper, which is based on findings from interviews with foreign companies operating in 
Korea during 2002, offers a cultural and institutional insight into the critical and often 
invisible issues to be considered for a successful realization of the vision. 
 
Keywords: Korea, Korean market, hub, multinational corporations 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
One of the most revolutionary aspects of the Korean company since the 1997 
Asian financial crisis is that Korea has emerged as a major recipient of foreign 
capital for both strategic and non-strategic industrial areas, ranging from 
consumer products to telecommunications.  By 2001, more than 11,500 foreign 
firms had invested in Korea (Economist Intelligence Unit 2002: 8) and by 2000 
more than 1,100 business sectors of Korea had been fully opened up to foreign 
investors (Economist Intelligence Unit 2002: 29).  In particular, during the four-
year period after the crisis (1998–2001), Korea has attracted around US$52 
billion in FDI, which is almost more than double the entire amount of the 
previous four decades (Kim & Choo 2002: 30).  Although Korea's attractiveness 
of FDI relatve to its economy, which was 13% to Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 
in 2000, Korea's recent inward FDI trend implies that the Korean market is 
rapidly changing and open to outsiders offering opportunities to maximize market 
benefit in Korea. 
 
On the other hand, the Korean government has shown its ambition in recent years 
to level up the country's economic status by setting up the new national agenda.  
In April 2002, the Korean government, then the Kim Dae-jung administration, 
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unveiled its grand ambition to turn the nation into an international business hub 
of Northeast Asia.  This master plan included establishment of the so-called 
"special economic zones" that consist of 132 sq km (40 million pyeong) of land 
encompassing Youngjong Island, Songdo New Town of Incheon and Gimpo to 
promote international business.  This new vision by radically improving market 
environment (covering foreign investment, finance, logistics, information 
technology, manufacturing and research and development) is now listed as one of 
the new government's (the Roh Moo-hyun administration, February 2003 – 
present) ten national agendas (Kim 2003: 17).  In particular, Korea's new 
President Roh has established a special task force team to develop and implement 
the new vision, specializing in three main specific sectors including logistics, 
finance and industry.  The logistics dimension is considered to be crucial given 
Korea's strategic and business location between Japan and China.  The Roh 
administration has also promised to improve the business and operating 
environment for the multinational corporations (MNCs) through socioeconomic 
and institutional reforms such as labor market conditions, chaebol (mostly 
family-owned large industrial conglomerates), liberalization of immigration 
policy and tax benefits at the national level.  In other words, tha attraction of 
MNCs has become one of the top priorities for the current Korean economy and 
the major component of the Korea's new globalization strategy (Sachwald 2003). 
 
However, despite the growing concern on the topic among government agencies, 
industry, media and academia, the absense of a cohesive and realistic approach to 
the issue is a relative void in the literature.  This is the backdrop of this paper, 
which offers a cultural and institutional insight into the critical and often invisible 
issues to be considered for a successful transformation of the nation into a 
business hub of Northeast Asia.  In particular, the paper, based on the interviews 
conducted in Korea, will offer analyses of their perceptions on the following 
issues: 
 
• Definition of hub 
• Brand image of Korea 
• Feasibility of Korea's hub vision 
• Institutional issues such as the role of Government and regulatory 
environment 
• Cultural issues such as patriotism and other social infrastructure. 
 
 
METHODOLOGY 
 
The paper is gounded in a study that is, in part, based on fieldwork performed in 
Seoul during 2002.  Over 30 interviews were conducted face to face with senior 
executives, mostly chief executive officers (CEOs) of foreign companies 
98 
MNCs' perception on the feasibility of South Korea 
operating in Korea, as well as various chambers of commerce in Korea.  
Although sample of the firms was small and not fully representative, MNCs were 
selected based on a wide range of sectors, lengths of stay in Korea, nationalities 
of firms and individuals and firm sizes.  Sectors include agro-industrial products 
architecture and design management, pharmaceutical production and distribution, 
insurance, construction and construction management, logistics consultancy etc.1 
Interviewees were required to reflect on their experiences in the Korean market 
compared to their experience in other international markets and on their 
perceptions on the Korea's new globalization strategy (economic and business 
hub of Northeast Asia) and its (hub vision) feasibility. 
 
 
HUB VISION: NEW PARADIGM? 
 
It seems obvious that Korea needs to establish a regional business center as its 
survival strategy in this rapidly changing and competitive age of globalization, 
especially with the geographical and technological advantages that Korea 
possesses.  However, on the question of "hub" there seems to be a variety of 
opinions.  Some refer to a logistical hub given Korea's geographicala advantage 
(its close proximity to China and Japan) and its possession of a newly established 
airport and potential mega-hub ports (Lamers 2002; Kim 2002; Feller 2003).  
Others researchers (Seitz 2002; Raubach 2002; Rooney 2002) focus on Korea as 
a regional financial center given that the nation is blessed with good 
infrastructure such as modern telecommunication facilities and high-speed 
internet network.  Despite a sound and coherent strategic direction yet to emerge, 
Korea's new vision has seemingly been designed in an effort to create an image 
of Korea as a home for MNC's regional headquarters (RHQs), bringing foreign 
capital and technology as a consequence of Korea's becoming the logistical and 
financial center of Northeast Asia. 
 
 
                                                 
1  Macquaire Corporate Finance Advisory Group, Alcan Daehan Aluminum, Deloitte Consulting, 
Shisheido, Phamacia Korea, Costco, Pfizer Pharmaceuticals Group, Siberhegner, Meat & 
Livestock Australia, BHP Billiton, Allianz Insurance, Ford Motor, syngenta Korea, 
Partekcagoteh, Australian Embassy, Australia-New Zealand Bank, Industrial and Commercial 
Bank of China, Maersk Logistics, European Union Chamber of Commerce, JETRO, American 
Chamber of Commerce in Korea, Hanmi Parsons, IRC Limited, IT Management Services, 
Moody International, Master Foods Korea, German Chamber of Commerce, Grand Hyatt, Bank 
One, Motorola, Mitsui & Co. Ltd., Kim & Chang Law Firm, Australia-New Zealand Chamber of 
Commerce in Korea, Taylor Lelson Sofres, Australian Trade Commission, AAB Korea, AIG 
General Insurance.,  The author would like to acknowledge the financial support for this study 
from School of Management, Edith Cowan University, Korea Foundation, Australia-Korea 
Foundation and Korea Trade-Investment Promotion Agency.  The author would also like to 
thank the anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments. 
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TABLE 1 
THE KOREAN GOVERNMENTS STRATEGY FOR HUB 
 
Logistics Business Industry 
Special economic 
zones 
Home of MNCs regional 
headquarters 
Hub of information 
technology (IT) 
Airports (Incheon) Financial centre Creation of local IT and 
digital media industry 
clusters 
Mega-ports 
(Pusan/Kwangyang 
container ports) 
Foreign-friendly business 
environment 
 
 
Despite the Korean government's and the media's effort in recent months, the 
majority of foreign companies in Korea do not seem to agree on what exactly is 
meant by "hub".  There seems to be two critical reasons that support this 
observation.  First, to foreign companies, Korea as a business hub, especially a 
regional financial center by any standards is unrealistic.  Unlike Hong Kong and 
Singapore who have successfully built a "foreign-friendly business environment" 
such as English-speaking domestic workforce, effective urban-planning for 
foreign professionals, and the overall global mind-set among government 
bureaucrats, business leaders and employees, etc.  Equally important, Korea still 
lags Hong Kong and Singapore in infrastructure and internationalization and has 
a smaller domestic market than Japan and China (Feller 2003).  Second, the 
market (48 million people) size and its potential of the Korean economy coupled 
with Korea's growing importance as a market in the global economy and their 
(MNCs) global strategies to expand to new markets turned out to be three most 
persuasive factors in MNCs' initial decision to invest in the Korean market. 
 
This has been revealed during the interviews.  Almost none of the interviewees 
on the question of Korea as a potential regional RHQ site responded that their 
initial decision has got nothing to do with intent of establishing a RHQ in Korea.  
Korea is not regarded among the MNCs as a center of business activity, but 
rather difficult as well as rewarding place to do business.  In other words, the 
judgement of foreign companies on the territory, as evidencedd by this study, is 
that there is ample opportunity for foreign companies to develop business  
ventures in Korea.  Table 2 reveals MNCs' perception on the "hub vision". 
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TABLE 2 
MNCs' GENERAL PERCEPTIONS ON KOREA'S HUB VISION 
 
Hub vision Perception 
Ambiguous? 
Attention seeking? 
Realistic? 
Korea: center of business? 
Hub vision = long-termism? 
Korean market = opportunity? 
Potential to be a business hub? 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
No 
No 
Yes 
Yes 
 
Note: The table should be treated as inicative of general 
perceptions rather than conclusive. 
 
Brand Image of Korea 
 
Until very recently Korea has been among the least receptive to foreign direct 
investors in the Asian region, with the inflow of FDI accounting for just 1.1% of 
gross fixed capital formation in 1995.  This contrasts with a regional average of 
9%, and ratios of 25.7% in China, 24.6% in Singapore and 17.9% in Malaysia 
(Morgan 1997).  Although FDI in Korea in 1996 increased sharply, a rise of 65% 
in amount (US$3.2 billion) over the previous year, Korea still compares poorly in 
terms of FDI (2.2% of GDP) with countries like China (18.2%), Malaysia 
(28.5%) and Taiwan (7.3%) (European Union Chamber of Commerce 1997: 60; 
Sakong 1998: 105–106).  Korea was one of the few Asian countries that did not 
liberalize inflows of foreign capital until the mid-1990s. Until 1993, non-
residents were given very limited access to the Korean stock market while the 
types of securities that local firms could issue abroad were expanded. 
 
The main reason for not having a larger business presence in Korea is due to its 
long history of economic nationalism stimulated by negative experiences as a 
result of earlier interactions with foreign regimes.  A strong belief in self-
sufficiency has inevitably resulted in a tough business climate, seemingly 
especially hostile to foreign companies.  Korea has always been for foreign 
companies a difficult market to set up and invest in.  It has also been difficult to 
form joint ventures so it has not been an easy market. 
 
According to analysis by the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU 2002) on FDI 
environment, Korea was ranked as the least favourable destination among 60 
countries in which to invest, although Korea was ranked ahead of Japan and 
Thailand. 
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TABLE 3 
OVERALL RANKING OF INVESTMENT CLIMATE OF KOREA  
IN THE ASIAN REGION, 2001 
 
Environment Rank  1997–2001 
Rank  
2002–2006 
Overall position 
Political environment 
Political stability 
Political effectiveness 
Macroeconomic environment 
Market opportunities 
Policy towards private enterprise and competition 
Policy towards FDI 
Foreign trade and exchange controls 
Taxes 
Financing 
The labor market 
Infrastructure 
8 
8 
10 
7 
12 
4 
7 
9 
8 
8 
9 
12 
7 
6 
8 
10 
7 
1 
3 
7 
4 
8 
10 
7 
12 
7 
 
Asian region includes Australia, China, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, New Zealand, 
Pakistan, the Philippines, Singapore, Korea, Sri Lanka, Taiwan and Vietnam. 
 
Source: Modified from Economist Intelligence Unit (2002): 18. 
 
One of the major indications from the above study is that although there is a 
general skepticism among foreign business community on the variable quality of 
the tax regime and rigidities in the Korean labor market, the sheer scale of the 
market opportunity coupled with the ongoing and progressive process of 
deregulation and economic stability combine to create a  major upside.  In March 
2002, the American Chamber of Commerce in Korea (AMCHAM) conducted a 
market environment survey with CEOs (approximately 1,700 individuals) of the 
Fortune 500 companies in the Asia-Pacific region on eight categories including 
Korea's macroeconomic and global business environment and preception of the 
Korean market in comparison with Hong Kong, Singapore, Shanghai and Tokyo 
(AMCHAM 2002).  The survey echoes the EIU analysis (2002) in that while the 
CEOs believe the market potential is perceived to be bright, Korea's brand image 
and global business environment are far less competitive than other major cities 
of Asia. 
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TABLE 4 
MNCs' GENERAL PERCEPTIONS ON THE BRAND IMAGE OF KOREA:  
BEFORE AND AFTER COMING TO KOREA 
 
Before After 
Two Koreas (which one?) 
Militant unions 
Small country 
IMF crisis (financial crisis of 1997) 
Difficult market to crack 
No idea 
A high value of strategic location 
Risky but a huge potential 
A wealth of opportunity 
An attractive market 
Yet barriers are too many 
RHQ; no intent 
 
It has been taken for granted that Korea's economic policy over the last three 
decades has been strongly nationalistic.  Prevailing perceptions are that there is 
chronic inefficiency and opaqueness in the Korean government and across 
society, difficulty in market access, unequal treatment in the domestic market, 
and relatively higher political and social instability than in other major Asian 
markets.  Many of the interviewed CEOs indicate that although Korea's economic 
development over the last few decades and deregulation since the financial crisis 
of 1997 have been impressive, elements in the environment such as corruption, 
labor-management conflict, taxation and red tape are no better, and perhaps 
worse, than other Asian countries.  A fundamental and obvious implication of 
this irony is that Korea is a tough market to invest in but the market and its 
potential overwhelm the obstacles and other issues that hinder their operation in 
Korea. 
 
Interviewees were overwhelmingly positive about the prospects for their 
businesses in Korea.  Over 70% of the interviewees had clearly developed visions 
for their businesses in Korea.  More than 80% of those held positive views about 
the Korean market and were bullish about the position they aimed to develop.  
The vast majority is seeking aspirational positions.  Despite these positive aspects 
of the market image, there are many fundamental challenges for Korea to 
overcome in transforming the nation into a home for RHQs. 
 
These observations clearly indicate that the cost of foreigness such as 
unfamiliarity with local economic, cultural and political rules, regulations and 
business norms does not in fact influence the behavior of MNCs but the market 
and economy size and its potential are much more persuasive in their decision to 
invest into the Korean market.  Thus, the most critical step that Korea must take 
in keeping the MNCs in the market and attracting more volumes of FDI, and 
eventually making Korea a world-class business center is an effort to create a 
general perception among existing investors and MNCs in Korea that "Korea 
now has well-developed business environment including high-quality manpower, 
foreign business-friendly and pleasant physical environment" and "we are 
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fortunate to invest in Korea" Korea should also be able to offer comparative 
advantages for why the MNCs should choose Korea as an investment destination 
rather than its neighboring countries.  Does Korea have comparative and 
competitive advantages against them? There are of course a number of 
advantages and disadvantages. 
 
 
HUB FEASIBILITY 
 
On the surface, there is no doubt among interviewees that Korea has an enormous 
potential to be a business hub in the Northeast Asian region since the nation has 
already achieved internal and external requirements.  Internally, Korea, according 
to Porter (1990) possesses a strong competitive advantage in factor conditions 
both in basic and advanced factors.  Over the last four decades, Korea's lack of 
natural endowments has caused the nation to invest in the creation of advanced 
factors such as education, infrastructure and advanced communications systems 
to make its industries globally competitive. Korea's telecommunication 
infrastructure (utilization of internet) is already second in Northeast Asia.  Korea 
is also investing very aggresively in the essential infrastructure for a business 
center such as construction of a high-speed railway between Seoul (capital city) 
and Busan (second largest city in Korea), upgrading of deep-sea ports in Busan 
and Gwangyang and the establishment of the new international airport in 
Incheon.  Further, China's entry tot the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the 
gradual shift of business activity from Southeast to Northeast Asia in accordance 
with the rapid but strong economic development of the region will accelerate 
Korea's role in the region.  But Korea still considered among CEOs of MNCs, in 
general, to be an unattractive place for doing business.  Thus, Korea's new vision 
for becoming Northeast Asia's business hub is nothing but a desk theory.  The 
following discusses some fundamental but critical prerequisites for Korea to 
achieve its goal, which are heavily based on the  interviews with the CEOs of 
MNCs in Korea during May 2002. 
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TABLE 5 
FEASIBILITY OF KOREA'S EMERGENCE AS A BUSINESS HUB  
OF NORTHEAST ASIA 
 
Strengths Weaknesses Threats 
Rich market potential 
Strong industrial base 
Abundance of highly 
educated manpower 
High savings rate 
Strategic business location 
Excellence in IT 
China's entry to WTO 
Geographical proximity 
Transparency across society? 
Open, flexible and fair? 
Language? 
Accountability? 
Cultural diversity? 
Appreciation of foreign 
companies? 
Global mind-set across 
society? 
Strong role of government 
Emergence of Shanghai as 
a business center 
South-North confrontation 
More aggressive reform 
undertaken by Singapore, 
Hong Kong and China 
Instability of domestic 
politics 
Korea's vulnerability to 
international business 
Weak social infrastructure 
(English proficiency, 
globalize mind-set) 
 
 
THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT 
 
A crux of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) requests in 1997 was to uproot 
crony capitalism; non-transparent financial practices involving government, the 
chaebol and major banks; and the prolonged but rapid wage increase that 
outstripped the gains in labor productivity, which all contributed to the erosion of 
Korea's international competitiveness. 
 
A critical point is that until the advent of President Kim Dae-jung administration 
(1998 – 2002), the government-chaebol alliance has been very active, using the 
control of finance (Bank of Korea) as a key policy tool.  This enabled the 
government to have control over politics and led to the practice of favoring 
people and companies (chaebol) in regard to economic policies.  A number of 
chaebol groups benefited from this tight alliance, especially when they needed 
financial help in expanding their industries overseas, including European 
countries.  It is no wonder that most of the top 30 chaebol groups were found to 
have piled up debts averaging about 4.5 times more than their assets in 1997.  
The debt-to-equity ratio averaged 449.4% in 1997.  The top 30 chaebol groups 
accumulated a total debt of 249.67 trillion won (US$177 billion).  This shows a 
sharp contrast with other countries like the US (160%), Japan (206%) and 
Taiwan (86%) (Gong 1999).  Among the heaviest borrowers were the big five 
chaebol: Hyundai, LG, Daewoo, Sunkyung and Samsung. 
 
The Korean government is still regarded as a "god father", presiding over most 
aspects of economic affairs (Kim 1999).  Korea's political and economic 
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structures are still under government influence.  Korean financial sectors, over 
the last four decades, have been under the government umbrella.  Key figures in 
the major banks used to be appointed by the president himself and all financial 
matters were dealt with by the Ministry of Finance (now the Ministry of Finance 
and Economy).  Although there has been some change in terms of the 
government and president's perception towards the role of banks since the IMF 
involvement in the Korean economy, the above tradition is still prevalent.  This is 
why the role of the Korean government and bureaucrats still does not make sense 
to many foreign investors in Korea. 
 
Korea's Regulatory Environment: A Real Barrier? 
 
More than 90% of interviewees put a heavy weight on the importance of 
networking in doing business in Korea.  But the importance of relationships 
exists in all countries although it differs to some degrees.  It is a generally 
accepted view that in every country one finds bureaucrats are strict, conservative 
and uncooperative.  The Korean regulatory environment, difficult even for 
Korean firms, poses a particular challenge to the foreign investors (Office of the 
Investment Ombudsman (OIO) 2001).  It is one of the most urgently needed areas 
to be corrected for Korea to become a regional business hub. 
 
Laws and regulations are often generally framed.  In particular, government's 
current policy of frequent working-level post rotation (1 to 2 years) decreases the 
degree of expertise.  The meaning of the law in practice thus depends on 
discretionary interpretations by working-level officials, thus increasing the 
opportunities for inconsistent application, discrimination and corruption.  
Working-level officials, particularly in divisions like Immigration and Taxation 
Departments, often rely on unpublished internal ministerial guidelines and 
unwritten administrative guidance in interpreting and administering the law.   But 
one thing that differentiates Korea from the rest of the world is that the personal 
relationships are a little bit more effective in Korea.  This is because relationships 
are much more formal in Korea.  Over 60% of interviewees cited the exceptional 
nature and importance of networks that distinguish Korean business culture from 
other Asian countries.  Those with experience of other major markets thought 
that the importance and intensity of networking exceeds both that of Japan, Hong 
Kong and other Asian countries.  These networks incorporate school friends 
(secondary and tertiary) going back 40 to 50 years, the region from which people 
originate, particular universities and of course army friends.  The following 
remarks made by a CEO of an MNC in Korea depicts the difficulty of doing 
business in Korea. 
 
When we go the relevant government agency and deal with pharmaceutical 
affairs, you find most of the bureaucrats are from one of the top universities in 
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Korea.  Meanwhile, in filing for registration, it usually takes 2 or 3 years because 
it requires experiments and heaps of documents.  But if an employee of a certain 
company and the bureacrats are from the same university, they let the company 
know about the required materials before the review process is complete.  So the 
company can prepare all required materials ahead of other companies and they 
can save a considerable amount of time.  That is not possible for foreign 
companies.  Now that we know this sort of practice, so we select a special person 
who does that kind of lobbying. 
 
Korean Consumers as a Hurdle? 
 
Until very recently Korea has been among the least receptive to foreign direct 
investors in the Asian region, with the inflow of FDI accounting for just 1.1% of 
gross fixed capital formation in 1995.  This contrasts with a regional average of 
9%, and ratios of 25.7% in China, 24.6% in Singapore and 17.9% in Malaysia 
(Morgan 1997).  Although FDI in Korea in 1996 increased sharply (a rise of 65% 
in amount [US$3.2 billion]) over the previous year, Korea still compares poorly 
in terms of FDI (2.2% of GDP) with countries like China (18.2%), Malaysia 
(28.5%) and Taiwan (7.3%) (European Union Chamber of Commerce 1997: 60; 
Sakong 1998: 105–106).  Korea was one of the few Asian countries that did not 
liberalise inflows of foreign capital until the mid-1990s.  Until 1993, non-
residents were given very limited access to the Korean stock market while the 
types of securities that local firms could issue abroad were expanded. 
 
Government protection and restrictions on foreign goods and companies such as 
cars, consumer durables, construction and international travel are prevalent, 
especially in the wake of trade deficits.  In the airline industry for example, the 
Korean government sees the deficit coming from Korean's excessive spending in 
traveling overseas. 
 
Another complication for MNCs to be aware of is the general patriotic attitude of 
Koreans.  According to the 1998 survey conducted by Frank Small and 
Associates (Marketing and Research Consultants) over the Korean consumers, 
69% of the respondents thought that buying a foreign product would hurt Korea 
(Richardson 1998).  Although foreign products range from ice-cream, noodles, 
children toys, cosmetics, clothing and whiskies to electrical appliances such as 
vacuum cleaners; consumer acceptance is often slow, albeit progressive.  There 
still remains pride in national products among the people, although the younger 
generation, especially, is more willing to try foreign things. 
 
"Korean consumers" barriers to consideration stem from a variety of sources, 
including a basic lack of understanding as to the benefits of globalization, fears of 
appearing unpatriotic, ongoing fears of possible tax audits, criticism from friends 
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and family for excessive consumption and possible criticism from employers.  
Due to the strong influence of traditional Confucian hierarchical social norms, 
imported vehicles are not even allowed on many Korean companies' premises.  
Even some MNCs operating in Korea have non-import car policies in deference 
to Korea's strong anti-import sentiments.  Many, if not all, of these barriers to 
consideration have been created and reinforced by previous Korean government 
administrations (AMCHAM 2002). 
 
Koreans' patriotic attitude also stems from the people's unwillingness to 
communicate with the so-called "outsiders" due to their weak English language 
skill.  This communication barrier arguably is one of the major attributes that 
make Korea as an unattractive place to set up a RHQ.  Almost every interviewee 
responded negatively to the question of communication barrier.  Other major 
cities like Shanghai and Tokyo are also probably weak in English but when one 
considers these markets they offer better conditions such as the size of market, 
potential and living conditions.  There are of course many ways to enhance the 
English language abilities of Koreans such as education and English language 
infrastructure (e.g., international schools, foreign media, more foreign teachers at 
primary to tertiary institutions).  But most importantly, consensus among every 
part of Korean society should be drawn that English language proficiency is an 
essential international business tool and must learn intangible skill in this 
globalization era. Prompt but detailed measures and strategies (regular 
workshops, professional training [onshore and offshore], etc.), in enhancing the 
people's global perspective and strategic mind (that will play as a key success 
factor in creating global corporate culture and a better business environment), 
should be prioritized in places like government, government agencies, tertiary 
institutions, and small-and-medium sized firms as well as chaebols.  This would 
certainly enhance the brand image of Korea and its market among potential and 
existing MNCs. 
 
Social Infrastructure: A Major Barrier? 
 
If one takes a close look at AMCHAM's recommendation on five areas in regards 
to prerequisites for Korea to become a Northeast Asian business hub, he/she can 
easily see the recommendations to the Korean government were intentionally 
made in order of priority.  These are: (1) tax rates, (2) foreign exchange controls, 
(3) labor flexibility, (4) English language, and (5) country image.  This is because 
the Chamber's primary function is to "protect the interests of member companies 
(2,200 individuals and 1,000 member companies) operating in Korea".  The first 
priority, which regards corporate and income tax rate imposed on foreign 
companies in Korea, was also one of the hot issues during the author's fieldtrip 
(May 2002) to interview a number of foreign companies in Korea.  Surprisingly 
enough, a majority of the interviewees responded not unfavorably, meaning that 
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while they are not satisfied with the current tax rates, these are not major business 
deterrents in Korea.  Instead they (interviewees) cited that Korea should put more 
efforts on offering an image that Korean business and society is fair and 
transparent.  They had many experiences of being discriminated and treated 
unfairly.  Korean tax rates in comparison with other major Asian countries are 
not higher in real terms (AMCHAM 2002) but the process and often arbitrary 
interpretation of laws and regulations on taxation created a wrong image of Korea 
(OIO 2001).  More importantly, their experiences go mouth-to-mouth among 
expatriates in Seoul and their head offices in various regions.  This is why the 
Korean government should establish a control tower that checks and encourages a 
fair and open competition among local and foreign businesses rather than reacting 
too sensitively to recommendations offered by foreign chambers of commerce in 
Korea, especially AMCHAM in Korea. 
 
One key aspect of Korean working environment that foreign countries must come 
to grips with is that of the confrontational relations between labor unions and 
management (Sakong 2003).  In fact, apart from more general deterrents to FDI, 
the Korean labor market is the single most consistent worry by foreign MNCs.  
Many interviewees and foreign chambers of commerce like AMCHAM believe 
that the Korean labor law gives significant benefits to the Korean union members 
with weak protection for management (AMCHAM 2002).  For example, 
 
Korean labor laws still discourage firms from dismissing staff by requiring companies 
recruiting new staff in two years following dismissals to try to rehire laid-off workers 
and, in cases involving large numbers of workers, to notify the Ministry of Labor in 
advance, providing the reasons for the dismissal and proof that they have consulted 
sufficiently with staff (Economist Intelligence Unit 2002: 18). 
 
The Korean labor unions are militant and tend to pursue their aims in a merciless 
way.  A failure to understand the nature and style of the process will be, at the 
very least, demoralizing for an expatriate manager.  Interviewees voiced 
unanimously that when they try to initiate, what they considered from the 
management's point of view, sensible negotiations, showing them the books, 
trying to tell the negotiators what shape the company is in – there was disinterest 
on the negotiators' behalf.  As Sakong claims that "Korea can become Northeast 
Asia's business hub – if only it can provide a business-friendly environment" 
(Sakong 2003). 
 
An equally important issue that emerged from the fieldtrip is the question of 
whether Korea is a place that foreign people want to visit and stay and come back 
or whether Seoul is truly an international city.  Contrary to AMCHAM's finding 
that expatriates living in Seoul view Korea favorably, the answer was "No" to 
both issues.  In particular, foreign CEOs who have been living in Korea less than 
three years responded negatively.  A crucial implication of this is that those 
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responding unfavorably will bring a negative image of Korea to their home 
companies, and this has been repeated for a long period of time.  This is because 
perception and image made by their predecessors last relatively long.  Given that 
normal tenure for a foreign assignment among MNCs is 3 to 4 years, which is the 
normal period for expatriates to get accustomed to a very homogeneous culture 
like Korea, many expatriates leave the market with their previous perception or 
even bias.  Why has Korea been regarded among foreign expatriates as an 
unpleasant place to visit or live, especially when it is compared with cities like 
Singapore, Hong Kong, Shanghai and Tokyo? 
 
Favorable FDI policies and laws (tax and labor) coupled with appropriate 
infrastructure for various hubs such as finance, logistics and other businesses may 
attract MNCs and eventually their RHQ2.  But issues socio-political and business 
cultures should not be underestimated.  In other words, human issues are as 
important as business matters.  Paradoxically, international businesses are all 
about humans and their families.  Many of the interviewed CEOs' families in 
Korea are apart from each other.  Many immediate family members of foreign 
CEOs returned home earlier because of the cultural and domestic environmental 
barriers that are prevalent in Korea.  According to some interviewees, for a Korea 
post, some companies prefer candidates who have no family obligations.  Since 
Korea is heavily Seoul-oriented, everything must be resolved within the capital, 
including children's education, visas, accomodation, cultural activities, etc.  
Despite much publicized propaganda (establishing a residential complex for 
foreigners in the special economic zones) on ongoing improvements in relation to 
the quality of life in Seoul, the reality is that none of the above meets global 
standards.  Importantly, most interviewees put a high priority on their children's 
education, weekends, food, convenience, double-standard renting systems and 
cost of living in Seoul as much as business concerns.  If Korea has less to offer to 
potential foreign residents, it is hard to attract foreign companies as well.  
Although there have been a few special economic zones designated (one in near 
Incheon international airport for business hub and two in the areas of ports of 
Pusan and Kwangyang for logistics hubs) where foreigners can find more 
favorable business and living environments (e.g. income-tax exemptions, 
simplified visa requirements, financial support, international schools, hospitals, 
accommodations, etc.) (Feller 2003), the government should also need to offer a 
credible reason that there will be no disadvantage in terms of convenience for 
existing foreign companies to shift their business operations to outskirts of Seoul.  
Further, in order for Korea remain as a Northeast Asian business hub candidate, 
more transparent measures should be taken to improve the regulatory framework 
and supervisory process in implementing plans and initiatives.  In other words, 
even the "special economic zone" concept is not persuasive yet, rather it only 
serves as a symbolic gesture. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
This paper has delivered an analysis of Korea's new globalization strategy 
initiated by the Korean government in early 2000s.  In doing so, it has offered 
cultural and institutional insights into some of the most critical issues to be 
considered for a successful transformation of Korea into a business hub of 
Northeast Asia.  Insights and critical evaluation have been produced especially on 
various different interpretations of the hub concept and socio-cultural and 
institutional barriers to becoming a hub.  In relation to Korea becoming a 
business center of Northeast Asia, and the general problems in the business 
environment for MNCs (which would need to be overcome for most MNCs to 
choose Korea as a hub), there is also a lack of clarity over the concept of hub, the 
parameters of the region targeted, and the timetable for achieving hub status. 
 
This study has also shown that while the foreign business community in Korea 
unanimously is in favor of Korea's great potential to be a business hub of 
Northeast Asia, many of MNCs operating in Korea perceive the new vision as 
"too ambitious" and "unrealistic" unless there is a stark change in the current 
form of Korea's internal and external market environment. 
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